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THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION IN WASHINGTON
CORNELIUS J. PECK--
The scope of judicial review of administrative action in the state
of Washington is a subject to be approached with caution. The
number and variety of statutory review provisions make the possi-
bility of summarizing the law and drawing valid and useful conclu-
sions seem near to impossible. Though some cases quite clearly
discuss the factors which affect the scope or intensity of judicial review
of particular types of administrative action, other cases in which such
analysis is much needed fail to mention or discuss the problem. One
is led to wonder whether the law is truly to be found in those cases
which deal with the problem or in those cases which ignore it. Never-
theless, taking a broad view, it seems possible to make certain general
observations. And those general observations lead to the conclusion
that existing Washington law on the subject does not depart materi-
ally from the administrative law principles developed in many other
states. Moreover, one is led to conclude that it would be possible to
adopt a uniform system of review and eliminate much confusion and
uncertainity without causing any major revision in the relationship
between the courts and the administrative agencies.
THE STATUTORY REVIEW PROVISIONS
The number and variety of review provisions found in Washington
statutes are staggering. On the simple matter of where review should
be sought or what courts have jurisdiction to review administrative
action there are at least eight different formulations. Review at the
seat of the state government by the superior court of Thurston County
appears to be a favorite with legislative draftsmen.' But any idea
* Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Washington. The author is
indebted to Julian C. Dewell, Esq., for research assistance which he gave while a
student.
1 This is the case in the important areas involving action of the Director of Licenses
in revoking, suspending, or refusing to renew or issue a license, RCW 43.24.120, and
action of the Tax Commission in denying petitions for refunds, RCW 82.32.180. It
also is true in a number of specific licensing statutes. RCW 18.32.270 (dentistry) ;
RCW 18.72.280 (medicine and surgery); RCW 18.78.140 (practical nurses); RCW
18.88.250 (registered nurses) ; RCW 43.74.065 (basic science law certificates) ; RCW
88.16.100 (pilots on Puget Sound). A similar provision has been made in a number
of statutes affecting government employees. RCW 41.32.610 (teachers' retirement);
RCW 41.40.420 (state employees' retirement) ; RCW 43.43.100 (state patrol). Like
provision has been made with respect to some regulatory agencies. RCW 43.52.430(State Power Commission); RCW 48.04.110 (Insurance Commissioner); RCW
70.79.360 (Board of Boiler Rules); RCW 80.04.120 and RCW 81.04.170 (Public
Service Commission); RCW 30.04.040 (State Supervisor of Banks); RCW 31.04.050
and RCW 31.04.190 (State Supervisor of Banks-miscellaneous loan agencies) ; RCW
33.04.060 (State Supervisor of Banks-Savings and Loan Associations).
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that this provision is made to ensure expertness or familiarity with
administrative law problems on the part of the judiciary in that
county seems to be dispelled by the number of provisions for review
elsewhere under statutes in which the need for providing a local forum
for review seems no greater.2 Thus other provisions are made for
review by "any Superior Court,"' by "the Superior Court of the Com-
plainant's residence,"' by "the Superior Court wherein the principal
place of business is located,"' by "the Superior Court of the county
wherein the controversy arose,"' by "the Superior Court where the
injury took place,"' and by "the Superior Court where the land is
located."' Other provisions contain an indefinite reference to review
"in any competent court."'
Scope of Review. More pertinent is the variation in the statutory
formulations of the scope of judicial review to be given administra-
tive action. One frequent standard is the provision that the review
proceeding be "de novo,"' ° to which various and sometimes contra-
dictory phrases are attached. For example, in workmen's compensa-
tion cases, the hearing in the superior court is "de novo" but the court
may receive only evidence offered before the board and the findings
and decision of the board are treated as "prima facie correct.""
Review proceedings are tried "de novo" and "as in a civil action" for
cases involving revocation of the license of a pilot on Puget Sound."
2 For example, there appears to be no reason why review of the decisions of the
Washington State Medical Disciplinary Board may be reviewed in either the superior
court of Thurston County or the superior court of the county in which the appellant
resides, RCW 18.72.280; while review of the refusal, revocation, or suspension of
licenses of dentists may be had only in Thurston County, RCW 18.32.270.
8 RCW 14.04.320 (Aeronautics Commission); RCW 15.04.050 (Director of the
Department of Agriculture); RCW 18.83.160 (certified psychologists); RCW
18.92.210 (veterinarians).
4 RCW 18.04.320(8) (accountants); RCW 18.42.110 (engineers and land sur-
veyors) ; RCW 18.72.280 (Medical Disciplinary Board); RCW 49.60.270 (Discrimina-
tion in Employment Tribunal); RCW 50.32.120 (unemployment compensation);
RCW 51.52.110 (industrial insurance appeals) ; RCW 74.08.080 (old age assistance).
5 RCW 18.85.271 (real estate brokers); RCW 49.60.270 (Discrimination in Em-
ployment Tribunal); cf. RCW 31.12.060 (Credit Unions).
1 RCW 28.88.040 (school officers and school boards).
7 RCW 51.52.110 (industrial insurance appeals); cf. RCW 49.60.270 (Discrimina-
tion in Employment Tribunal).
8 RCW 89.08.330 (soil conservation); cf. RCW 14.12.200 (airport zoning); RCW
77.28.120 (game farmers); RCW 90.04.050 (water rights); RCW 90.48.130 (water
pollution control) ; cf. RCW 79.08.030 (public lands).
1 Cf. RCW 43.21.210 (Department of Conservation and Development); RCW
43.22.320 (Department of Labor and Industry).10 RCW 17.04.230 (Weed Control Districts); RCW 18.83.160 (certified psycholo-
gists) ; RCW 18.92.210 (veterinarians) ; RCW 28.88.070 (school officers and school
boards) ; RCW 31.04.190 (miscellaneous loan agencies) ; RCW 82.32.180 (Tax Com-
mission).
11 RCW 51.52.115.
12 RCW 88.16.100.
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They are "de novo" and "as an ordinary civil action" in cases in-
volving revocation of a pharmacist's license."3 Appeals from orders
of the Water Pollution Control Commission, however, are heard "de
novo as a cause in equity."' 4 Other variations of the "de novo"
formula include "de novo ... without a jury"'" and "de novo" fol-
lowing "the practice in the trial of appeals from justice courts."'
This welter of provisions relating to de novo review is only a warn-
ing of what is to be discovered in other statutory provisions. Pro-
vision that the appeal be "heard as a case in equity" is fairly com-
mon." Likewise common is the provision that the appeal shall be
heard as appeals from justice courts." With naive confidence in the
certainty of the law, other provisions have been made for review "as
in other civil actions,"1 "at law, 20 or "subject to the review of the
orders of other administrative bodies of the state."' Review of rul-
ings of the Director of the Department of Agriculture under the
Agricultural Enabling Act proceeds under the provisions governing
certiorari proceedings with power on the part of the court to deter-
mine whether the ruling is "in accordance with law."22
Other statutory provisions direct that particular review proceedings
be conducted "in a summary manner" 3 or be "informal and sum-
mary." One provision directs the court "to give a full hearing""
while others preserve "full opportunity to be heard upon the issues
of law.
2 6
As mentioned above, in the de novo review of orders of the Board
of Industrial Insurance Appeals the court is precluded from consid-
eration of evidence "other than, or in addition to, that offered before
the board or included in the record filed by the board in the superior
'a RCW 18.64.200.
14RCW 90.48.130.
15 RCW 79.08.030 (public lands).
10 RCW 41.32.640 (teachers' retirement).
'7 RCWV 41.40.420 (state employees' retirement); RCW 50.32.120 (unemployment
compensation); RCW 70.41.140 (hospital licensing); RCW 90.48.130 (water pollu-
tion control).
14 RCW 43.24.120 (Department of Licenses); RCW 15.36.590 (Fluid Milk Act);
RCW 15.80.130 (Weighing Commodities in Highway Transport); RCW 41.32.640
(teachers' retirement).
10 RCW 33.04.060 (Savings and Loan Associations).
2oRCW 43.21.210 (Dept. of Conservation and Development); RCW 43.22.320
(Dept. of Labor and Industry).
21RCW 14.04.320 (Aeronautics Commission).
22 RCW 15.66.200.
23 RCW 43.43.100 (Washington State Patrol) ; cf. 18.85.290 (real estate brokers);
RCW 70.79.360 (Board of Boiler Rules).
24 RCW 70.41.140 (Hospital Licensing Act).
25 RCW 18.43.110 (engineers and land surveyors).
2-RCW 50.32.120 (unemployment compensation); RCW 70.41.140 (Hospital
Licensing Act).
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court."27 Upon appeals from orders of the Washington State Power
Commission, "[t]he appeal shall be heard and decided by the court
upon the record before the commission or director.... "28 Upon appeal
from orders revoking the licenses of real estate brokers the court's
determination "shall be based solely on the transcript of the record
[compiled before the Director of Licenses]."" Other provisions limit
the range of review to "the evidence adduced at the hearing before the
director.""
Finality of Fact Findings. Respect for the inventive quality of
the human mind grows with contemplation of the different ways in
which the degree of finality and validity of administrative fact find-
ings has been stated. Thus, it is provided that "[t] he findings of fact
of the board, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be accepted
by the court as conclusive."" A different statutory formulation uses
the test of "the preponderance of the evidence" while still another
requires "a fair preponderance," 3 and another makes the findings
"conclusive if supported by evidence." 4 Fact findings of the State
Director of Public Assistance are conclusive unless the evidence in
the record preponderates against them." Findings of the Washing-
ton Public Service Commission are subjected to the test of "reason-
ableness and lawfulness."3 Like some other administrative findings,
they have "prima facie" validity. 7
While this summary of the variations and inconsistencies of statu-
tory provisions concerning judicial review is lengthy, it is far from
complete. Many other formulations may have been overlooked
because of the difficulties and inadequacy of indices.38 Also unac-
27 RCW 51.52.115.
28 RCW 43.52.430.
29 RCW 18.85.290.
3°RCW 18.32.270 (dentistry). Cf. RCW 18.78.140 (practical nurses); RCW
41.40.420 (state employees' retirement); RCW 50.32.120 (unemployment compensa-
tion) ; RCW 70.41.140 (Hospital Licensing Act).
31 RCW 14.12.200 (airport zoning). Cf. RCW 49.60.260, providing, "The findings
of the hearing tribunal as to the facts, if supported by substantial and competent
evidence shall be conclusive." (emphasis provided).
32 RCW 18.72.300 (Medical Disciplinary Board).
33 RCW 18.85.290 (real estate brokers).
34 RCW 89.08.330 (soil conservation).
35 RCW 74.08.080.
86 RCW 80.04.170. Cf. also RCW 18.78.150 (practical nurses); RCW 30.04.040
(banks and trust companies) ; RCW 43.43.100 (Washington State Patrol).
37 RCW 80.04.430 and RCW 81.04.430. Cf. RCW 50.32.120 (unemployment com-
pensation); RCW 51.52.115 (industrial insurance appeals); RCW 90.04.060 (water
rights).
38 In this respect, it may be hoped that if the compilation of these statutory vagaries
does not stir interest in providing a uniform statutory formula, it will at least serve as
an index to comparable statutory review provisions and thus furnish the bar with
another tool for discovery of precedent.
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counted for are the inconsistencies which exist through the failure
of the legislature to make any provision regarding juricial review in
some statutes. For such an example of the patchwork nature of the
existing system, one may note that express provisions can be foun4
concerning the judicial review of action of the Supervisor of Banks
with respect to banks and trust companies,"' savings and loan associa-
tions," industrial loan companies,4 ' small loan companies42 and credit
unions. 3 But, apparently, no review provision exists with respect to
crop credit associations or mutual savings banks. Instead, with
respect to mutual savings banks, provision has been made purportedly
making final an administrative determination by a specially consti-
tuted board of appeal.4
Effect of Statutory Variations. Given this tremendous variation
in statutory language and the legal profession's ability to seize upon
the particular form of words used in any statue as being of controlling
significance, one would expect to find the reports full of cases dis-
tinguishing other cases on the basis of the particular statutory lan-
guage involved. Perhaps the challenge in this field has been too great.
In any event, very few cases make any such distinctions." On the
contrary, to a very considerable extent the law and the cases developed
with respect to one administrative agency are cited as precedents
and authorities with respect to other agencies.
In part this may be due to the fact that administrative action is
frequently reviewed in a common law proceeding based upon one of
the extraordinary writs rather than through the particular review
procedure established by statute. For example, one may find a con-
siderable number of cases citing authorities involving different admin-
istrative agencies because of the common element that each case was
a mandamus action." However, other cases which have become lead-
80 RCW 30.04.040 and RCW 30.08.040.
40 RCW 33.08.070 and RCW 33.04.060.
41 RCW 31.04.050 and RCW 33.04.190.
42 RCW 31.08.260.
43 RCW 31.12.060.
4 RCW 32.08.050.4 5 In Manlowe Transfer & Distributing Co. v. Department of Public Service, 18
NVn.2d 754, at 757, 140 P.2d 287 (1943), a case involving orders of the Department of
Public Service respecting transportation rates, the court distinguished cases arising
under the unemployment compensation act as being "... somewhat dependent upon the
express wording of that statute." In In re St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wn.2d
580, at 593, 110 P.2d 877 (1941), a case arising under the unemployment compensation
act, the court attributed to the legislature an intent to restrict the review under that
act because of the differences in the language of the review provision of that statute
and the review provision of the workmen's compensation act
40 State er rel. Brown v. Board of Dental Examiners, 38 Wash. 325, 80 Pac. 544
(1905), involving the licensing of dentists, has served as an authority in mandamus
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ing precedents in the administrative law field have no such common
procedural element, but they are frequently cited in cases arising
under different statutes and involving different administrative agen-
cies. Thus, one case in the workmen's compensation field"7 has
become a leading case on the meaning of the phrase "arbitrary and
capricious" and it has been cited as a controlling precedent in cases
involving the State Department of Health,"8 the Department of Social
Security,49 the Department of Public Welfare," the Department of
Unemployment Compensation, 1 the Washington Toll Bridge Author-
ity,52 and the State Highway Committee."3 In another case, after
citing and discussing a number of leading cases, the court noted,
"These cases arose under different statutes, and involved different
administrative departments, but the underlying principles are identical
with those in the cases at bar."54 In short, the effect of the statutory
variations has been minimized or partially avoided because of the
common law technique-or habit-of reasoning from precedents and
by analogy.
The multiplicity of standards of review which might otherwise have
been expected to result from the heterogeneous statutory treatment of
judicial review has also been minimized because of limitations, inher-
ent and self-imposed, as well as constitutional, on the judicial process
itself. Because these limitations restrict its adaptability, the judicial
process has not formulated or applied a separate standard for each
statutory statement. Thus, one might expect a wide range in the dif-
ference between review of action of an administrative agency sub-
jected by statute to "de novo" review and the review of action for
which statutes have apparently provided less intensive review. In
actions involving of the supervisor of forestry and director of the department of con-
servation and development, State ex rel. Showalter v. Goodyear, 30 Wn.2d 834, 194
P.2d 389 (1948) ; the commissioner of unemployment compensation, In re St. Paul &
Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wn.2d 580, 110 P.2d 877 (1941) ; and the licensing of pilots on
Puget Sound, State ex rel. Sater v. State Board of Pilotage Commissioners, 198 Wash.
695, 90 P.2d 238 (1939).
47 Sweitzer v. Industrial Commission, 116 Wash. 398, 199 Pac. 724 (1921).
48 Whatcom County v. Langlie, 40 Wn.2d 855, at 865, 246 P.2d 836 (1952).
49 Robinson v. Olzendam, 38 Wn.2d 30, at 37, 227 P.2d 732 (1951) ; Morgan v.
Department of Social Security, 14 Wn.2d 156, at 184, 127 P.2d 686 (1942).
50 Straub v. Department of Public Welfare, 31 Wn.2d 707, at 723, 198 P2d 817
(1948).
51 In re Emp. Buffelen Lumber & Mfg. Co., 32 Wn.2d 205, at 208, 210 P.2d 194
(1948); In re Polson Lumber & Shingle Co., 19 Wn.2d 467, at 478, 143 P.2d 316
(1943) ; In re St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wn.2d 580, at 593, 110 P.2d 877
(1941).
52 State ex rel. Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 197 Wash. 110, at 123,
84 P.2d 688 (1938).
63 State ex rel. Hartley v. Clausen, 150 Wash. 20, at 28, 272 Pac. 22 (1928).54 Morgan v. Dept. of Social Security, 14 Wn.2d 156, at 184, 127 P.2d 686 (1942).
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fact, however, that range of difference has been considerably nar-
rowed by the constitutional doctrine prohibiting the delegation to
the judiciary of non-judicial functions.5 De novo review cannot be
so intensive as to constitute an unconstitutional delegation of non-
judicial functions. And it has been further narrowed by the judi-
cially developed doctrine that a trial "de novo" is not a completely
new trial. As the court has said, "a trial de novo does mean, and is
generally understood to mean, a trial anew; but it means anew, of
course, only as to the questions in issue."" And, as the discussion fol-
lowing will indicate, a number of other doctrines of judicial self-
restraint have had the effect of further limiting the scope of judicial
review "de novo."
CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Constitutional principles play an important part in setting the
boundaries and defining the content or intensity of judicial review of
administrative action. This should cause no surprise, since the
federal and state constitutions are the fundamental documents defin-
ing the relationship between government and the people as well as
between the branches of government. The judiciary is usually moved
to review administrative action at the insistence of persons who believe
they are being subjected to improper and unconstitutional govern-
mental action; when the judiciary does act in such cases one of the
major problems is that of retaining the proper constitutional rela-
tionship between the judiciary and the other branches of government.
Hence it is that constitutional principles are frequently called into
operation.
No Constitutional Protection. At the one extreme in Washington
are those businesses and vocations which, because of their potential
evil consequences, are said to operate under conditions determined
wholly within the discretion of the administrative authorities and
G5 Household Finance Corporation v. State, 40 Wn.2d 451, 244 P.2d 260 (1952).
58 In re Littlefield, 61 Wash. 150, at 153, 112 Pac. 234 (1910) ; State ex rel. Cohn v.
Superior Court, 11 Wn.2d 167, at 171, 118 P.2d 783 (1941). See Household Finance
Corp. v. State, 40 Wn.2d 451, at 457, 244 P.2d 260 (1952). Cf. also In re St. Paul &
Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wn.2d 580, at 593, 110 P.2d 877 (1941), which arose under a
statute providing that appeals t. . shall be heard as a case in equity but upon such
appeal only such issues of law may be raised as were properly included in his applica-
tion before the appeal tribunal." The court said, ".... we are constrained to hold that
the administrative determination of the facts is conclusive on the court unless it be
wholly without evidential support or wholly dependent upon a question of law, or
clearly arbitrary or capricious." The court was aided in reaching this conclusion by
the provision that the appeal proceedings were to be "informal and summary" as well
as by comparison of the scope of the usual appeal in equity. But the case is another
reminder that statutory language, which at first might be taken to reopen the entire
case on appeal, may be construed to permit a much narrower review.
19581
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
without the protection that is afforded through judicial review. In-
cluded in this category of businesses and vocations are public dance
halls,57 the pawnbroking business," public pool halls," and the busi-
ness of selling liquor." While it may be difficult to distinguish, on
the grounds of potential evil consequences, between an improperly-
run meat market6 or drug store62 and improperly-run dance halls or
pool halls, the distinction nevertheless exists. And, it is a distinction
which must be reckoned with by those in the unprotected businesses
who deal with administrative agencies and their personnel. More-
over, in language that was broader than the facts of the case demanded,
the court once indicated that the public interest in preserving health
subjected all persons to an exercise of the police power by public
health officers without the protection of judicial review.6 Of course,
these cases do not hold that the power to review administrative action
in these areas cannot be given to the courts; they hold only that there
is no constitutional requirement that such review be provided.
The Constitutional Fact Doctrine. At the other extreme in Wash-
ington there is authority that the power of the courts to review admin-
istrative action on certain constitutional questions cannot be impaired
or limited by statute, but that the parties affected are entitled to an
independent judicial review of the constitutional questions pre-
sented.64 Such questions are to be decided by the courts after con-
sideration of both the facts and the law, free from any limitations
which a statute may have attempted to impose by giving binding
effect to administrative findings and conclusions. The case estab-
lishing this proposition is a rate-making case which rests squarely
upon the constitutional fact doctrine of the Ben Avon" and St.
57 Bungalow Amusement Co. v. Seattle, 148 Wash. 485, 269 Pac. 1043 (1928).
58 Asakura v. Seattle, 122 Wash. 81, 210 Pac. 30 (1922).
59 State ex rel. Sayles v. Superior Court, 120 Wash. 183, 206 Pac. 966 (1922).
60 State ex rel. Puyallup v. Superior Court, 50 Wash. 650, 97 Pac. 778 (1908);
State ex rel. Aberdeen v. Superior Court, 44 Wash. 526, 87 Pac. 818 (1906).61 Brown v. Seattle, 150 Wash. 203, 272 Pac. 517 (1928).
62 Seattle v. Gibson, 96 Wash. 425, 165 Pac. 109 (1917).
63 State ex rel. McBride v. Superior Court, 103 Wash. 409, 174 Pac. 973 (1917). If
the decision is limited to that necessary upon the facts, no serious problems arise.
Since all questions of procedure were waived, 103 Wash. at 412, the novelty disappears
from the issuance of a writ of prohibition by the Supreme Court to prevent further
proceedings on a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court. All that needed to be
held was that it was within the power of the legislature to make the determination of
a fact of infection with syphilis by a properly constituted health officer final and not
subject to retrial on the basis of additional expert testimony. But the opinion contains
much broader language, based to a considerable extent upon the failure to differentiate
between the role of a court in reviewing a regulation of general applicability and adju-
dication of an individual case.
'4 State ex rel. Pac. T. & T. Co. v. Department of Public Service, 19 Wn.2d 200, at
218-221, 142 P.2d 498 (1943).
65 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
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Joseph Stock Yards" cases. Whether or not the Washington case
has shared the gradual death attributed to the federal cases on which
it was based"7 cannot be said. Nor can it be said whether Washing-
ton follows the ailing if not deceased companion doctrine of Crowell
v. Benson,6" which requires not only independent determination but
also judicial or court room trial of those facts deemed to be jurisdic-
tional in a constitutional sense. One case69 arising under the unem-
ployment compensation act holds that the existence of the employer-
employee relationship is not a jurisdictional fact concerning which
the parties are entitled to introduce evidence upon review by the
superior court. Instead, it is a question to be decided within the
statutory jurisdiction of the administrative agency and upon the
record compiled before that agency. Other cases have involved ques-
tions said by the court to be jurisdictional, but likewise considered
by the court as questions to be determined in the first instance by the
administrative agency.7"
Procedural Due Process. Of course, the record upon which the
agency action is based is more frequently compiled before the admin-
istrative agency than in the later court review proceedings. In such
cases, if the findings of the administrative agency are to be given
any degree of finality, constitutional principles are again called into
operation to ensure that in the administrative hearing procedural fair-
ness and due process of law were given to the parties affected.
In this area, the Washington court has followed the traditional
distinction made between issuance of regulations of general applica-
bility and the adjudication of individual cases. The constitution of
the state, like the federal constitution, does not require that hearings
be held before regulations of general applicability are issued.71 Of
course, the statute conferring authority upon an administrative
agency to make regulations of general applicability may require the
agency to hold hearings before taking action. In such a case the hear-
C St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
67 See, e.g., DAVIs, ADmInISTATIE LAW, 919-920 (1951).
OS285 U.S. 22 (1932). See Schwartz, Does the Ghost of Crowell v. Benson Still
Mlalk?, 98 U. OF PA. L. REV. 163 (1949).69 In re Farwest Taxi Service, Inc., 9 Wn.2d 134, at 141, 114 P.2d 164 (1941).
70 State ex rel. Northeast Transp. Co. v. Abel, 10 Wn2d 349, at 355, 116 P.2d 522
(1941) ; State ex rel. Puget Sd. Nay. Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 164 Wash. 237,
at 241, 2 P.2d 686 (1931).
71 Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, 113 Wash. 359, 194 Pac. 595 (1920). Cf. Bi-
Metallic Investment Company v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
This function is, of course, comparable with the legislative function and it is carried
on pursuant to authority conferred by the legislature. Adjudication, on the other hand,
is to be compared with the judicial process. See Floyd v. Dept. of Labor and Indus-
tries, 44 WNn.2d 560, at 569-571, 269 P.2d 563 (1954).
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ing held must be adequate and fair, though not necessarily the kind
of hearing which would be required for the purpose of adjudicating
individual cases."
While many cases fail to distinguish properly between the making
of regulations of general applicability and the adjudication of indi-
vidual cases, the distinction has been observed in a few cases, 73 and
greater concern has been shown for ensuring procedural fairness in
the cases of adjudication or the setting of rates for individual com-
panies.7 Thus, the admission of evidence in a rate-making proceed-
ing under circumstances which made it practically impossible for the
company to meet it by introduction of other evidence was held to be
a denial of due process of law, requiring reversal of the agency's
action.75 And at an earlier date the sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port findings in a rate-making case was held, at a federal level, to raise
a question of due process of law. 6
Judicial review thus ensures that, entirely aside from the substance
of the findings made and the action taken, adjudicatory proceedings
will be conducted in such a way as to afford constitutional due process.
Limits on Delegation. As noted above, another boundary of judicial
review has been marked out by constitutional principles. The doctrine
of the separation of powers prohibits the legislature from providing
for a review which is too intensive-a review which in fact would
constitute the delegation of non-judicial functions to the judiciary.
Thus, in the leading case on the point,7 it was held that a constitu-
tionally created court could not be given the authority to reverse the
decision of the supervisor of banking and grant a small loan company
72 State ex rel. York v. B. of C. Commissioners, 28 Wn.2d 891, at 915-916, 184 P2d
577 (1947).
73 See Floyd v. Dept of Labor and Industries, 44 Wn.2d 560, at 569-571, 269 P.2d
563 (1954), for a forthright discussion of the different types of functions performed by
administrative agencies.
74 Manlowe Transfer & Distributing Company v. Department of Public Service,
18 Wn.2d 754, at 758, 140 P.2d 287 (1943) ; But cf. K arlen v. Dept. Labor & Ind., 41
Wn.2d 301, at 304, 249 P.2d 364 (1952).
7 State ex rel. Puget Sound Navigation Co. v. Department of Transportation, 33
Wn.2d 448, 206 P.2d 456 (1949).
76 Northern P. R. Co. v. Department of Public Works, 268 U.S. 39 (1925), revers-
ing 125 Wash. 584, 217 Pac. 507.
77 Household Finance Corporation v. State, 40 Wn.2d 451, 244 P.2d 260 (1952).
But cf. Floyd v. Dept. of Labor & Ind., 44 Wn.2d 560, 269 P.2d 563 (1954), distin-
guishing the Household Finance case and holding that the courts may be given power
to review de novo the determinations of the Department of Labor & Industries because
its functions were judicial in character and of the kind which could have been given
in the first instance to the courts. Cf. also Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261
U.S. 428 (1923) ; Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Company, 281 U.S.
464 (1930) ; Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289
U.S. 266 (1933) ; for federal development of this limitation on judicial review.
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license on the basis of a judgment or discretion substituted for that
of the supervisor. On the other side of the problem of maintaining
the separation of powers, there arises the question of the delegation
of judicial powers to administrative agencies. Though there are other
solutions to the problem,"8 the usual formula is that while questions
of fact may be given to administrative agencies, questions of law
must be reserved for the courts. It is this formula that will now be
considered.
THE LAW-FACT DISTINCTION
A considerable number of Washington cases accept the law-fact
distinction as the appropriate division of authority and responsibility
between the courts and the administrative agencies. While in im-
portant cases there has been a break-through that has permitted a
more intelligent appraisal of the relationship of the courts and the
agencies, more of the cases proceed on the assumption that problems
of review of administrative action may be neatly divided into those
involving questions of fact and those involving questions of law. In
most cases the distinction is workable, and the harm that has resulted
from a failure to take a more discriminating approach to the problem
has probably been minimal. Nevertheless, those cases in which due
deference to the administrative view has not been given are cases
demonstrating that understanding in this area may bring improvement.
Legislative and Adjudicative Facts. The Washington cases draw
no distinction between the validity and finality to be accorded to
legislative-type findings, which provide the basis for a rule or regula-
tion of general applicability, and adjudicative-type findings, which
provide the basis for disposition of individual cases. Nor do they dis-
tinguish between the findings in licensing cases, rate-making cases,
and other cases. In part this may be due to the fact that the statutory
review provisions were, in most cases, drawn with a broad brush that
left no such fine lines.7" But since the court has recognized that the
same constitutional procedural requirements do not attach to the rule
or regulation making process as apply to cases of adjudication,"0 it
78 State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, at 210-211, 117 Pac. 1101(1911).
70 See e.g. RCW 80.04.430 and RCW 81.04.430, giving the same prima facie validity
to findings of the Public Service Commission with respect to both its orders and rules.
See also RCW 50.32.150 providing that the "decision" of the Commissioner of Unem-
ployment Compensation shall be prima facie correct, making no distinction between
the adjudicatory portion of his decisions and that portion which he may base upon
regulations enacted by him pursuant to delegated authority.
$1 See footnote 71, supra.
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seems that the distinction must be recognized even if it has not yet
been verbalized. In the area of regulation and rule-making there is
no constitutional requirement that the agency make its determination
entirely upon the evidence compiled in a record and after hearing.
Unless such a record and hearing are required by statute, the prob-
lem of review of the factual basis for agency regulations must of
necessity be considerably different from that faced where the question
is whether the evidence compiled in an adjudicatory proceeding pro-
vides a basis for that kind of agency action. Though debate goes on
as to the preferable solution,8' it seems almost inevitable that, unless
the statute provides a different formula, review of the factual basis
for rules and regulations of general applicability must take on the
aspects of the review of the factual basis for legislation enacted by the
legislature. Similarly, review of fact findings in cases of adjudication
must take on aspects of the review of fact findings by lower courts
or juries.
The traditional view that questions of fact are questions for the
administrative agency, while questions of law are questions for the
court, has been stated frequently." The court has recognized that
"it is often very difficult to determine the dividing line between ques-
tions of fact and questions of law." 3 It has also recognized that the
inquiry into the same matter may present either a question of fact
or a question of law.8" And, of course, whether there is a sufficient
evidentiary basis for the factual findings made by the agency is a
question of law.8"
The Finality Accorded Fact Findings. The question of the suffi-
ciency of the evidentiary basis for findings of fact is a question of the
81 Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HRv. L. REv. 364 (1943); Jaffe, Administrative Procedure, Re-examined: The Ben-
jainin Report, 56 HAv. L. Rnv. 704, 719 (1943); DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAiW, pp.
487-501 (1951).
82 State ex rel. Pac. Tel. & Tel. v. Dept. of Public Service, 19 Wn.2d 200, at 215,
142 P.2d 498 (1943) ; State ex rel. Am. Telechron Co. v. Baker, 164 Wash. 483, at
495-496, 2 P.2d 1099 (1931) ; State ex rel. G. N. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission,
81 Wash. 275, at 277-278, 142 Pac. 684 (1914); State ex rel. Megler v. Forrest, 13
Wash. 268, 43 Pac. 51 (1930). But see In re Littlefield, 61 Wash. 150, 112 Pac. 234(1910), where the court insisted that it was competent to pass upon the professional
qualifications of applicants to practice medicine.
83 State ex rel. Pac. Tel. & Tel. v. Dept. of Public Service, 19 Wn.2d 200, at 214,
142 P.2d 498 (1943).
84 State ex rel. Wash. Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 197 Wash. 110, at 119, 84
P.2d 688 (1938).85 Northern P. R. Co. v. Department of Public Works, 268 U.S. 39, at 44-45 (1925),
reversing 125 Wash. 584, 217 Pac. 507; North Bend Stage Line v. Denney, 283 U.S.
786 (1931), affirming 153 Wash. 439, Pac. 752; In re St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co.
7 Wn.2d 580, at 593, 110 P.2d 580 (1941) ; State ex rel. Am. Telechron Co. v. Baker,
164 Wash. 483, at 496, 2 P.2d 483 (1931).
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finality to be given administrative fact findings. Familiar rules have
been developed for determining the finality to be accorded findings
made by a jury or by a trial judge, or even the findings upon which
the legislature bases legislation. But, perhaps because of the many
statutory variations, there appears to be no uniform or even common
statement of the degree of finality to be given administrative fact find-
ings. Two early cases8" appeared to give complete finality to admin-
istratively-found facts, but their effect was limited by subsequent
treatment of similar questions as questions of law."
There are a number of statutory provisions making the findings or
even the decisions of certain administrative agencies prima facie cor-
rect."s In practice the provisions seem to have had little effect. Thus
it has been said that if the findings of the agency are not based upon
the evidence, the presumption of their correctness does not remedy the
deficiency or absence of evidence to sustain them.8" Another case
states that the meaning of the declaration that the decision is prima
facie correct means that if the evidence is evenly balanced, the finding
on that issue must stand. 0 Still another statement is that in addition
to the strength given the findings by the statutory provision, there
must also be substantial evidence to sustain the findings. 1 The statu-
tory provision has been said to place the burden upon the party attack-
ing the decision, but that burden appears to be no greater than it
would have been in the absence of such a provision." It thus appears
that the "prima facie" statutory formula has provided little more
than a buttressing argument for a court which has decided to approve
the administrative findings after giving them the same review it
would have given in absence of the provision.
In some cases it seems that the test of whether the record supports
the factual findings is whether the agency acted arbitrarily or capri-
86 State ex rel. Mlegler v. Forrest, 13 Wash. 268, 43 Pac. 51 (1895) ; State ex rel.
Smith v. Forrest, 8 Wash. 610, 36 Pac. 686, 1120 (1894).8 7 Williams Fishing Co. v. Savidge, 155 Wash. 443, 284 Pac. 744 (1930); Poison
Logging Co. v. Martin, 195 Wash. 178, 80 P.2d 547 (1938).
88 See footnote 37, supra.
s1 State ex rel. T. S. Etc. v. Kuykendall, 42 Wn.2d 885, at 891, 259 P.2d 838 (1953).
Cf. State e.x rel. Northeast Transp. Co. v. Abel, 10 Wn,2d 349, at 355, 116 P.2d 522
(1941).80 Oiympia Brewing Company v. Department of Labor & Industries, 34 Wn.2d 498,
at 504, 208 P.2d 1181 (1949).
"I State ex rel. Puget Sd. Etc. v. Dept. P.W., 181 Wash. 105, at 110, 42 P.2d 424
(1935).
82 See Olympia Brewing Co. v. Dept. L. & I., 34 Wn.2d 498, at 504, 208 P.2d 498
(1949) ; State ex rel. Model NV. & L. Co. v. Dept. P.S., 199 Wash. 24, at 35, 90 P.2d
243 (1939).
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ciously in making the findings." Such a test is comparable to the
test used in determining the constitutional validity of legislation, and
would seem to be an appropriate test for these cases involving the
validity of regulations. Frequently the cases in which it is used are
cases of adjudication, but involve the matter of judicial deference to
policy judgments of the administrative agencies rather than a mere
review of fact findings. 4 They may also be the product of the man-
damus action in which the review is sought 5 or they may involve a
lack of subsidiary findings to support the agency action."0
The findings of the public service commission are, by statute,"7 said
to be prima facie correct. However, as indicated above, this provision
has little practical effect upon the review of orders of the commission,
and its fact findings are instead "given the same weight accorded to
any impartial tribunal, and may not be overturned unless the clear
weight of the evidence is against its conclusions, or unless it has mis-
taken the law applicable to the matter adjudicated, or, as sometimes
expressed, unless the findings show evidence of arbitrariness and dis-
regard of the material rights of the parties to the controversy." And,
"[i]f the clear weight of the evidence is against the finding of the
department, it will be set aside by the reviewing court, even though
supported by substantial evidence."9
If the procedure followed by the administrative agency in its hear-
ings is unfair to the parties, this will deprive the findings of finality
or validity.9" Thus, if the agency considers matters outside the record
in a rate-making case, and thus uses secret evidence,' its findings will
not be respected, nor will its order be enforced. The validity of find-
ings may also be affected by consideration of improper matters, though
93 In re St Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wn.2d 580, at 593, 110 P.2d 977 (1941);
Sweitzer v. Industrial Ins. Comm., 116 Wash. 398, at 401, 199 Pac. 724 (1921).94 E.g. Morgan v. Dept. of Social Security, 14 Wn.2d 156, at 184-185, 127 P.2d 686
(1942).
(lE.g., State ex rel. Showalter v. Goodyear, 30 Wn.2d 834, at 844, 194 P.2d 389
(1948).
96 Straub v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 31 Wn.2d 707, at 723, 198 P.2d 817 (1948);
cf. State ex rel. Bohon v. Dept. of Public Service, 6 Wn.2d 676, at 694, 108 P.2d 663
(1940).
97 RCW 81.04.430.
98 Manlowe Tr. & Dist. Co. v. D.P.S., 18 Wn.2d 754, at 758, 140 P.2d 287 (1943);
State ex rel. Model Water & Light Co. v. Dept. P.S., 199 Wash. 24, at 35, 90 P.2d
24 (1939).
9 See cases cited in footnotes 75 and 76, supra. See also State ex rel. York v. B. of
C. Com'rs., 28 Wn.2d 891, at 912, 184 P.2d 577 (1947). Cf. also Manlowe Tr. & Dist
Cr. v. D.P.S., 18 Wn.2d 754, at 758, 140 P.2d 287 (1943).
100 State ex rel. T.S. Etc. v. Kuykendall, 42 Wn.2d 885, at 893, 259 P.2d 838
(1953). See State ex rel. P.S. Co. v. Dept. Tr., 33 Wn.2d 448, at 484-5, 206 P.2d 456
(1949) ; State ex rel. Country Club v. Dept. of P.S., 198 Wash. 86 P.2d 1104 (1939).
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matters known to the parties involved.'' And, of major importance
is the apparent adoption by the Washington court of the residuum
rule, which requires that agency findings be based at least in part
upon evidence which would have been admissible in a court proceed-
ing."0 2 Stated otherwise, the findings may not be based exclusively on
evidence which would not have been so admissible.
Deference Accorded Legal Conclusions. In accordance with the
law-fact distinction, questions of law are reserved for the court and
are reviewed by it in the exercise of its independent judgment. Thus
the court will reverse agency action which it finds to be based upon
an erroneous construction of the law." 3 Moreover, because the court
exercises an independent judgment on the law, it in fact shows little
or no deference to the administrative view of the law as stated in inter-
pretative regulations. A familiar statement is, "Such regulations are
valid only as subordinate to a legislative policy and when found to
be within the framework of such policy. They may not extend a
statute or modify its provisions.' 0 4  Statements of deference to the
administrative view are made, but do not seem to control.'
Inadequacies of the Law-Fact Distinction. The law-fact distinction
provides a workable basis for division of authority between the
administrative agencies and the courts with respect to a large part of
judicial review of administrative action. However, numerous difficul-
ties may be encountered with a number of cases, as consideration of
those arising under the unemployment compensation act0 will indi-
cate. In a recent case the majority of the court apparently treated as
101 Public Service Commission v. State ex rel. Great N. R. Co., 118 Wash. 629, 204
Pac. 791 (1922) ; Cf. Northern Pacific Railway Company v. Dept. of Public Works,
268 U.S. 39 (1925), reversing 125 Wash. 584, 217 Pac. 507; State ex rel. Puget Sound
Etc. v. Dept. P.W., 181 Wash. 105, 42 P.2d 424 (1935). Cf. also State ex rel. Sater v.
State Bd. Pilotage Comm., 198 Wash. 695, 90 P.2d 238 (1939).
102 Leggerini v. Dept. of Unemployment Comp., 15 Wn.2d 618, at 622, 131 P.2d 729
(1942). For the leading case on the residuum rule not cited in the Leggerini decision,
see Carroll v. Knockerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916). For a dis-
cussion of the rule, see DAvis, ADmIr sTrATsvE LAW, p. 458 et seq. (1951).
'
0 3In Re Emp. Buffelen Lbr. & Mfg. Co., 32 Wn.2d 205, 209, 201 P.2d 194 (1948) ;
State ex rel. York v. B. of C. Com'rs., 28 Wn2d 891, at 912, 184 P.2d 577 (1947) ;
State ex rel. Pac. T. & T. Co. v. D.P.S., 19 Wn.2d 200, at 217, 142 P.2d 498 (1943) ;
Williams Fishing Co. v. Savidge, 155 Wash. 443, at 448, 284 Pac. 744 (1930).
104 Williams v. Hollenbeck, 49 Wn.2d 30, at 32, 297 P.2d 952 (1956), noted 32
WAsH. L. REv. 61 (1956). Cf. Fisher Flouring Mills v. State, 35 Wn.2d 482, at 492,
213 P.2d 938 (1950). Cf. also State v. Miles, 5 Wn.2d 322, 105 P.2d 51 (1940) ; State
ex rel. Sater v. State Bd. Pilotage Comm., 198 Wash. 695, 90 P.2d 238 (1939).105 Fisher Flouring Mills v. State, supra, note 104.
100 RCW 50.01.010 et seq. The provision of the act relating to appeals gives impetus
to the attempt to categorize issues as being of law or fact. It provides, "The proceed-
ings of every such appeal shall be informal and summary, but full opportunity to be
heard upon the issues of law shall be had before judgment is pronounced." RCW
50.32.100.
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a question of law the question of what constituted suitable work for
a person with the claimant's training and qualifications, and affirmed
the judgment of the superior court which had reversed the commis-
sioner's determination on this matter. 07
Another case"08 treated as a question of law that of whether claim-
ant was unemployed voluntarily when his employer's plant was shut
down for a vacation period pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
ment. In other cases the court has considered as questions of law,
sometimes without so labeling them, the questions of whether the
claimants were "available for work" and "actively seeking work";101
whether particular individuals were in the "employment" of an-
other; 1 0 whether the claimants were "participating in... or directly
interested in the labor dispute which caused the work stoppage";"
and whether any part of the net earnings of a hospital inured to the
benefit of any private individual."2 But other cases have treated the
question of whether certain individuals were in the "employment" of
others more as factual questions-at least factual questions in the
sense of limiting review to determination of whether the evidence in
the record would sustain factual conclusions stated in the statutory
language." 3 Similar treatment was once given to the question of
whether employees were participating in or directly interested in the
labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work."' And in the most
recent case" arising under the Act the court frankly acknowledged,
as it had at an earlier date, that the definition of "labor dispute" was
a matter which should be left largely to be determined by the com-
missioner. But in the same decision the court based its conclusion that
the Seattle waterfront was a single establishment within the meaning
of the act on the independent appraisal and findings made by the
trial court, without mentioning the findings or conclusions of the
commissioner.
Of course these cases can be-in fact many were-forced into the
107 In re Anderson, 39 Wn.2d 356, 235 P.2d 303 (1951).
208 In re Emp. Buffelen Lbr. & Mfg. Co., 32 Wn.2d 205, 201 P.2d 194 (1948).
109 Jacobs v. Office Unemployment Etc., 27 Wn.2d 641, 179 P.2d 707 (1947).
"
0 Broderick, Inc. v. Riley, 22 Wn.2d 760, 157 P.2d 954; Unemployment Comp.
Dept. v. Hunt, 17 Wn.2d 228, 135 P.2d 89 (1943).
"I' Wicklund v. Commissioner, 18 Wn.2d 206, 138 P.2d 876 (1943) ; In re St Paul
& Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wn.2d 580, 110 P.2d 877 (1941).
112 Virginia Mason Hospital Ass'n v. Larson, 9 Wn.2d 284, 114 P.2d 976 (1941).
1 3 McIntyre v. Bates, 45 Wn.2d 45, 272 P.2d 618 (1954); In re Foy, 10 Wn.2d 317,
116 P.2d 545 (1941) ; Mulhausen v. Bates, 9 Wn.2d 265; 114 P.2d 995 (1941) ; In re
Farwest Taxi Service, Inc., 9 Wn.2d 134, 114 P.2d 164 (1941).
114 In re Polson Lbr. & Shingle Mills, 19 Wn2d 467, 143 P.2d 316 (1943).
15 Ackerlund v. State etc. Dept., 49 Wn.2d 292, 300 P.2d 1019 (1956); noted 32
WAsH. L. REv. 104.
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categories of cases involving questions of fact or questions of law.
Indeed, some of the issues in them naturally fell into one category
or the other. But blunt instruments are being used if the delicate
relationship between the judiciary and the administrative agency in
all problems presented must be dissected and analyzed with only these
tools. Particularly is this true with a statute like the unemployment
compensation act, which, as Judge Finley noted in a dissent,' gives
to the commissioner broad authority and discretion. Use of the law-
fact distinction puts the court in the position of formulating policy
and drawing the lines of distinction in an area in which judges have
no great experience and in which the legislature apparently desired
that one who had accumulated such experience be vested with con-
siderable discretionary authority. And, as Professor Wollett has indi-
cated in his article on the workmen's compensation act, similar diffi-
culties have been encountered there because of a rigid adherence to
the law-fact distinction.
REvmw OF POLICY JUDGAMNT
Those cases in which the law-fact distinction proves to be an unsat-
isfactory formula for judicial review are usually cases in which the
courts are required to pass upon an administrative policy judgment.
They involve the question of when judicial judgment should be sub-
stituted for administrative judgment. This does not mean that the
cases are limited to those involving rules or regulations of general
applicability in which one expects to find administrative policy formu-
lated, because, as lawyers are well aware, policy is frequently formu-
lated on an ad hoc, or case by case, method. In these cases it may be
as difficult to separate law from fact in the making of the particular
policy judgment as it is to separate law from fact in the making of
the particular policy judgment as it is to separate law from fact in
the determination of what constitutes the particular standard of
reasonable care in an ordinary negligence action. In the latter case,
the practical answer of the law has been to give both questions to
the jury; in the administrative law field for similar reasons certain
problems involving both legal and factual questions must be given
to the administrative agency. And with some of the problems, because
of the specialized nature of the question, because of the expertness
of the agency personnel, and because their experience with similar
problems better equips them to solve the problem, there may be good
116 In re Anderson, 39 Wn.2d 356, at 366-371, 235 P.2d 303 (1951).
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reason for giving an even wider range of operation to the adminis-
trative agency than, by comparison, is given to a jury. This may be
true even though the policy is formulated in a regulation as a state-
ment of general applicability, similar to a rule of law. The question
may nevertheless not be one which is best treated as a question of
law to be determined by the judiciary in the exercise of an independ-
ent policy judgment.
Comparative Qualifications. In a number of cases the Washington
court has recognized, upon an appraisal of the comparative qualifica-
tions of the judiciary and the administrative agency, that the question
involved is one which should be left to the determination of the
administrative agency within broad limits." ' Frequently, as in man-
damus actions, the freedom of the agency to make and develop its
policy judgments is spoken of in terms of discretion."'8 In many other
cases and under many other statutes the same freedom has been given
through incorporation of the definition of "arbitrary and capricious"
action first given in Sweitzer v. Industrial Ins. Comm."9 The court
there held that the commissioners' refusal to reopen the case was not
arbitrary or capricious, saying,
... this is not arbitrary or capricious action. These terms, when used
in this connection, must mean willful and unreasoning action, action
without consideration and in disregard of the facts and circumstances
of the case. Action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised hon-
estly and upon due consideration where there is room for two opinions,
however much it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion was
reached.
In a number of cases the court has refused to substitute its judg-
ment for that of an administrative agency, even though it recognized
that other views not only were possible but might have seemed more
desirable. In such cases the view adopted by the agency need not
be the one which the court would adopt if the matter were one to be
decided by it as a matter of first impression. Thus, recognizing that
accounting and statistical skills were required and that the legisla-
ture intended the agency to utilize administrative expertness in these
117 Robinson v. Olzendam, 38 Wn.2d 30, at 37, 227 P.2d 732 (1951); Taylor-Ed-
wards Etc. Co. v. Department of Public Service, 22 Wn.2d 565, at 569, 157 P.2d 309(1945); Morgan v. Department of Social Security, 14 Wn.2d 156, at 184, 127 P.2d 686
(1942); State ex rel. Am. Telechron Co. v. Baker, 164 Wash. 483, at 495-496, 2 P.2d
1099 (1931) ; See Judge Finley dissenting In re Anderson, 39 Wn.2d 356, at 356, 235
P.2d 303 (1951).
o18 E.g. State e_< rel. Showalter v. Goodyear, 30 Wn.2d 834, 194 P.2d 389 (1948)
State ex rel. Wash. Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 197 Wash. 110, 84 P.2d 638 (1938).
119 116 Wash. 398, at 401, 199 Pac. 724 (1921). See the cases cited in footnotes 48
to 53, supra, for instances in which this definition has been used under other statutes.
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matters, the court has refused to substitute its judgment for that of
the Department of Social Security on the matter of what deductions
should be made for resources owned by recipients of old age and sur-
vivor's assistance benefits.12 Noting that it might not agree with
the supervisor of banking, the court nevertheless affirmed his denial
of small loan company licenses because of the supervisor's opinion
that the increased competition in the communities would be detri-
mental.12' In another case the court said that mere disagreement
with the action of the supervisor of forestry in classifying certain
lands as "forest lands" for the purpose of a special tax was not a
basis for setting aside his determination unless that determination
was arbitrary and capricious within the meaning given those words
in the Sweitzer case. 2' Recently the court has refused for similar
reasons to overturn administrative action transfering valuable prop-
erty from one school district to another.' Whether transportation
facilities in a given area are adequate to meet traffic demands can be
determined only by a survey of the conditions as they exist, and the
court has called this "purely an administrative function."'"4 Like-
wise, it has recognized that technical expertness as well as familiarity
with the economics of the industry are necessary to evaluation of a
system of charges for local telephone service based on the length of
time of the calls.1' Technical expertness and familiarity with details
of railroad operations are necessary to determination of whether a
grade crossing should be closed,'26 or whether an additional stop
should be added to a train schedule 2 ' and the court has refused to
set aside agency determinations in these matters upon determining
that an honest judgment had been exercised. Determination of the
extent and kind of approaches necessary to serve a bridge is a matter
requiring considerable knowledge of traffic demands, flow, and pat-
terns, and the court refused to reverse the Toll Bridge Authority's
decision that an extensive system of approaches was necessary even
220 Robinson v. Olzendam, 38 Wn.2d 30, 227 P.2d 732 (1951) ; Morgan v. Dept of
Social Security, 14 Wn.2d 156, 127 P.2d 686 (1942).
221 Household Finance Corporation v. State, 40 Wn.2d 451, at 463, 244 P.2d 260
(1952).
122 State ex rel. Showalter v. Goodyear, 30 Wn.2d 834, at 844, 194 P.2d 389 (1948).
12-Malaga School District v. KIincade, 47 Wn.2d 516, 288 P.2d 467 (1955).
224 Taylor-Edwards Etc. Co. v. Dept. of Public Service, 22 Wn.2d 565, at 569,
157 P.2d 309 (1945).
125 State ex rel. Am. Telechron Co. v. Baker, 164 Wash. 483, at 495-496, 2 P.2d 1099
(1931).
120 Dept. of Transportation v. Snohomish County, 35 Wn.2d 247, 212 P.2d 829
(1949).
227 State ex rel. G.N.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 81 Wash. 275, at 278, 142 Pac.
684 (1914).
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though the court made no independent determination that this solu-
tion was correct.' 28
Another line of Washington cases has apparently recognized the
superiority of the administrative agencies for solution of particular
questions by holding that the initial determination of such questions
must be made by the agency and not by the court.' Though recog-
nition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency does
not inevitably lead to a refusal of the judiciary's opportunity to exer-
cise independent judgment on the matter, it certainly is a step in that
direction. However, in a number of cases in which there was no con-
flict in the evidence, the court has assumed that facts may be found
initially by the judiciary and has not considered whether administra-
tive expertness and familiarity with certain types of problems might
lead to different results."
Substituted Judgment. In a number of cases the court has seen fit,
for a variety of reasons, to substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative agency. No subsequent case appears to exhibit the
unshakeable confidence shown by the court when it undertook to
review on the facts the qualifications of an applicant for a license
to practice medicine."' Perhaps it was the unexpressed assumption
that there could be no expert judgment on the matter that led the
court to overturn a determination of the commissioner of unemploy-
ment compensation and hold that an applicant was not eligible for
benefits because he had refused "suitable work."1 2 However, what
constitutes "suitable work" for an individual with certain training,
qualifications, and abilities would seem to be a matter of expert judg-
ment. At least there are many persons in the personnel field, making
wage and salary classifications and preparing job descriptions and
analyses, who have been given such work in the belief that specialized
training and experience have made them better able to discharge those
functions. Their continued employment suggests that belief in their
expertness has passed the test of economics if not the law.
128 State ex rel. Wash. Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 197 Wash. 110, 84 P.2d 688
(1938).
129 Lane v. Dept. Lab. & Ind., 34 Wn.2d 692, 209 P.2d 380 (1949) ; Wiles v. Dept.
Lab. & Ind., 34 Wn.2d 714, 209 P.2d 462 (1949) ; Straub v. Dept. of Public Welfare,
31 Wn.2d 707, 198 P.2d 817 (1948) ; State ex rel. Northeast Transp. Co. v. Abel, 10
Wn.2d 349, 116 P.2d 522 (1941) ; DeStoop v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 1 Wn.2d
340, 95 P.2d 1026 (1939) ; Puget Sound Nay. Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 152 Wash.
417, 278 Pac. 189 (1929).
130 Manlowe Tr. & Dist. Co. v. D.P.S., 18 Wn.2d 754, 140 P.2d 287 (1943) ; In re
Foy, 10 Wn.2d 317, 116 P.2d 545 (1941) ; Virginia Mason Hospital Ass'n v. Larson,
9 Wn.2d 284, 114 P.2d 976 (1941).
181 In re Littlefield, 61 Wash. 150, at 152, 112 Pac. 234 (1910).
132 In re Anderson, 39 Wn.2d 356, 235 P.2d 303 (1951).
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In a case involving the interpretation of the words "partially proc-
essed" and "pre-cooled" in a truck tariff issued by the director of
transportation, the court recognized that this was an area in which
the administrative judgment was supported by experience and expert-
ness, but reversed the director's order because it displayed a disregard
for the material rights of the parties. 3 Perhaps this latter determina-
tion-that there had been a disregard for the material rights of the
parties-was made because the court focused its attention upon the
interests of the shipper and the truck line, which were both satisfied
with the lower rate charged, and overlooked the public interest,
apparent to the director, in preventing deviations from tariff rates
or transportation at low rates which bring about ruinous competition.
Suspicions about the integrity of the administrative process and
the objectivity of a union-dominated board may have led to rejec-
tion of what would otherwise seem to have been a reasonable admin-
istrative view that the efficiency of the pilotage service on Puget
Sound required limitation of the number licensed to practice that
trade.' " The result can be explained on the basis of statutory con-
struction, as the court made an alternative suggestion that if the
legislature had intended to permit the board to limit the number of
licensed pilots it would have said so expressly.'
Whenever a case appears to turn on matters of statutory construc-
tion, the administrative view will not have the same stature it enjoys
in other contexts, because the court, quite naturally, believes that it
is more expert and capable in this area than the administrative agen-
cies. As mentioned above, while deference to the administrative view
stated in interpretative regulations is sometimes expressed, it is
seldom given controlling effect. If the problem is one susceptible of
treatment as a problem of statutory construction, the court is likely to
exercise an independent judgment.' However, there is a danger in
so treating cases, because the experience of the agency in working with
the problem assigned to it by the legislature may have given signifi-
cance to statutory language not immediately apparent in the context
of the particular litigation, though obvious to those working with
the problem administratively or to those who had investigated the
13 Floe v. Cedergreen Frozen Pack Corp., 37 Wn.2d 886, 226 P.2d 871 (1951).
114 State ex rel. Sater v. Bd. Pilotage Comm., 198 Wash. 695, 90 P.2d 238 (1939).
13r 198 Wash. at 703.
"3 Williams v. Hollenbeck, 49 Wn.2d 30, 297 P.2d 952 (1956) ; Broderick, Inc. v.
Riley, 22 Wn.2d 760, 157 P.2d 954 (1945) ; State ex rel. Wohleb v. Yelle, 196 Wash.
26, 81 P.2d 864 (1938).
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problem in the preparation and drafting of a statute."' In such a
case, of course, the administrative agency concerned should point out
in more detail than appears in most briefs just what part of the experi-
ence and expertness leads to deference to their administrative view of
the matter. This will require some relaxation of the view that resort
to matters outside the record is prohibited as the use of secret evi-
dence.'
Other factors may lead to assertion of judicial superiority in
dealing with a particular problem. There is general agreement
with the concept that retroactive changes are unfair and should be
avoided. Frequently the concept is one that may be enforced by the
courts without approval or condemnation of the practice or policy
either before or after the change.' A statutory provision relating to
remedies to be granted by a court upon application by an agency is
one which the court might well construe independently to determine
how the legislature intended it to use its powers, even though its con-
struction conflicts with the administrative view of how the judicial
powers should be used. 4 The fact that courts have in other contexts
developed the technique of piercing the corporate veil where form
has been utilized to obscure the substance of transactions naturally
leads to an assumption that the court is as capable as an administra-
tive agency in determining whether the profits of a charitable corpora-
tion are in fact, if not in form, accruing to the benefit of a private
individual. 4
There have been difficulties in this area of judicial review of policy
judgments made by administrative agencies. But it is not so much
that the courts have assumed and asserted a superiority in cases where
they might better have let the administrative judgment stand, or that
they have failed to exercise independent judgment in cases where
they should have done so, that has caused the difficulties. It is instead
137 See note, 32 WAsH. L. REv. 61 (1957).
138 See e.g. State ex rel. T.-S. etc. v. Kuykendall, 42 Wn.2d 885, 259 P.2d 38
(1953) ; State ex rel. P.S.N. Co. v. Dept. Tr., 33 Wn.2d 448, at 484-487, 206 P.2d
456 (1949) ; State ex rel. Country Club of Seattle v. Department of Public Service,
198 Wash. 37, 86 P.2d 1104 (1939) ; State ex rel. G.N.R. Co. v. R.R. Com., 60 Wash.
218, 110 Pac. 1075 (1910). Compare State ex rel. York v. B. of C. Com'rs., 28 Wn.2d
891, at 915, 184 P.2d 577 (1947), where the view is expressed that in granting a fran-
chise to a utility the board of county commissioners need not consider only matter
presented at the hearing. Compare also Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Com-
mission of Calif., 324 U.S. 548 (1945). See DAvis, ADmiNISTRATrVE LAW, p. 539 et.
seq. (1951).
139 Hansen Baking Co. v. City of Seattle, 48 Wn.2d 737, 296 P.2d 670 (1956).
140 State ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Skagit River Navigation & Trading Co.,
181 Wash. 642, 45 P.2d 27 (1935).
'4' Virginia Mason Hospital Ass'n v. Larson, 9 Wn.2d 284, 114 P.2d 976 (1941).
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the lack of explicit and open evaluation of the comparative abilities
of the courts and the agencies that has caused the difficulties. When
the real reasons for the action taken lie unexpressed and hidden behind
the law-fact distinction and words such as "discretion," "arbitrary
and capricious," or "unreasonable," a decision furnishes no guide for
the future cases. Frank discussion and evaluation of the comparative
abilities of courts and agencies would disturb an appearance of legal
certainty and predictability while doing much to achieve both. Mis-
takes would still be made, and perfection would still go unattained.
But, as with many things, the problem of dividing responsibility and
authority could be better handled openly than by indirection.
CONCLUSION
One who has labored through this discussion of the scope of judicial
review of administrative action in the state of Washington will prob-
ably agree that it is a subject to be approached with caution. He
might add that it is also one to be approached by those with either
a surplus or a near-to-inexhaustible supply of energy. But, if this
author is correct, he will agree that while statutory formulations of
principles seem endless, in the main Washington law on the subject
does not depart materially from administrative law principles and
practices developed in other states.
Here, as elsewhere, constitutional principles have shaped the major
outlines of administrative law. The view that persons engaging in
some activities are not entitled to any constitutional protections may
be difficult to sustain as a broad proposition, but it certainly is not a
view unique with Washington. The constitutional fact doctrine, set-
ting a minimum limit on judicial review, was obviously based upon
earlier federal cases. The distinction between rule or regulation
making and adjudication has been observed here with respect to the
constitutional requirement of a hearing, and, though there is still
much to be desired, the court has undertaken to ensure that parties
to administrative adjudication are afforded due process and fair
hearings.
As in other states, the law-fact distinction has been accepted as the
appropriate and usual line for dividing authority and responsibility
between courts and agencies. But, as in other jurisdictions, consid-
eration of the necessities of the situation has led to abandonment of
the distinction for particular problems. The substituted tests have
been whether the action was within the "discretionary" powers of the
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agency, whether it was "unreasonable," or whether it was "arbitrary
and capricious." Thus more freedom for exercise of policy judgment
has been given administrative agencies than would be possible under
the law-fact test.
Looking at the many and varied statutory review provisions of
Washington law for the first time, one might be led to think that
adoption of a uniform system of review, applicable to all administra-
tive agencies, would constitute a major change and require a revision
of the relationship between the courts and individual agencies. How-
ever, investigation of the cases decided under those many and varied
provisions shows that there is a substantial degree of uniformity.
That such uniformity exists is of major concern to one who under-
takes to draft a single provision for review of all administrative action.
The Model State Administrative Procedure Act was intended only
as a model-as something from which a legislature could begin to
draft provisions appropriate to local conditions." 2 Consideration of
the review provisions of the Model Act 43 leads to the conclusion that
it provides a rather complete and detailed list of the conditions for
affirmance and bases for reversal of administrative action developed
by case law in Washington.
If the review provisions of the Model Act are subject to any criti-
cism as a restatement of local law it is that they give less freedom
to administrative agencies than the Washington court has given in
those cases in which it has refused to substitute its judgment for that
of the agency. The Model Act appears to accept the law-fact distinc-
tion as the universally satisfactory line for division of authority and
responsibility. And, it literally subjects not only findings, but the
inferences, conclusions, and the entire decisions of administrative
agencies to the same gauntlet of tests. It thereby limits the effec-
tiveness of the expertise and familiarity with specialized problems
which administrative agencies may develop.
Of course, this pitfall might be avoided by a construction which
limited the requirement of evidentiary record support to fact mat-
ters and, using the words of the Model Act, permitted administra-
tive freedom as being within "the statutory authority or jurisdiction
of the agency," provided that it was not "arbitrary or capricious."
Such a construction gains support from consideration of section 9 of
'
42For a history of the Model Act, see Stason, The Model State Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 33 IowA L. Rav. 193 (1948). The article is one of a symposium devoted
to consideration of the Model Act.
14 See sections 6, 12 of the Model Act, appendix.
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the Model Act, which deals with rules of evidence and official notice.
On the whole, it might be better to utilize the review provisions of the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 44 which permits a more nar-
rowed review and thus allows greater freedom for agency action. 45
In any event, a uniform provision, perhaps combining desirable fea-
tures of both acts, could be adopted without causing any major
readjustment of the relationship between the courts and the indi-
vidual agencies. Such a provision is much needed to eliminate the
confusion and uncertainty which now exists in the absence of a
uniform statutory provision.
144 Section 10 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act provides: "Sec. 10.
Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law
committed to agency discretion-(a) Right of review.-Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any
relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.
* * *
(e) Scope of review.-So far as necessary to decision and where presented the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any
agency action. It shall (A) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; and (B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;(3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or short of statutory
right; (4) without observance of the procedure required by law; (5) unsupported by
substantial evidence in any case subject to the requirements of section 7 and 8 or other-
wise reviewed on the record of any agency hearing provided by statute; or (6) unwar-
ranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the
reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations the court shall review the
whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party, and due account
shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
245For comparisons of the judicial review provisions of the federal act and the
Model Act, see Abel, The Double Standard in Administrative Procedure Legislation;:
Model Act and Federal Act, 33 IowVA L. Ray. 228, at 245 et seq. (1948) ; Schwartz, The
Model State Administrative Procedure Act-Analysis and Critique, 7 Ruzas L.
REv. 431, at 455 et seq. (1953).
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